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LEARNED HAND’S SEVEN OTHER IDEAS ABOUT 
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Vincent Blasi* 
I say “other” because, regarding the freedom of speech, Learned Hand has 
suffered the not uncommon fate of having his best ideas either drowned out 
or credited exclusively to others due to the excessive attention that has been 
bestowed on one of his lesser ideas. Sitting as a district judge in the case of 
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,1 Hand wrote the earliest judicial opinion 
about the freedom of speech that has attained canonical status. He ruled that 
under the recently passed Espionage Act of 1917,2 writings critical of 
government cannot be grounds for imposing criminal punishment or the 
denial of mailing privileges unless the authors tell their readers it is in their 
interest or is their duty to violate the law.3 Hostile criticism very likely to 
cause harm or intended to do so is not punishable under that statute, he 
concluded, if it stops short of direct advocacy of law violation.4 He derived 
this standard in the guise of statutory interpretation but very little in the text 
of the law or its history of passage suggested his reading. Rather, to support 
his preferred test Hand drew upon what he took to be the basic 
presuppositions of democratic governance, assumed to underlie the 
enactment of the statute. In subsequent private correspondence, he repeatedly 
invoked his test as not only implicit in the Espionage Act but also the best 
interpretation of the First Amendment.5 
Hand’s focus on the exact meaning conveyed by the speaker’s words 
rather than their likely or intended effect represents a different approach from 
that of his peers, most notably his friend and hero Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., whose clear-and-present-danger test, introduced two years later, 
turns on predicted consequences and speaker intentions.6 It has become a 
                                                                                                                            
 * Vincent Blasi is Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School. 
 1. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 2. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 1, 40 Stat. 217. 
 3. Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 540. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758, 763, 765–66, 768, 770 (1975). 
 6. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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staple of First Amendment study to examine the limits of the principle of 
freedom of speech by comparing the contrasting tests of Holmes and Hand.7 
In these comparisons, Hand typically holds his own and the subject is 
illuminated, even if this focus on the operational test or standard tends to 
divert attention from much else that Hand’s Masses opinion has to offer. 
To simplify, Hand’s test has the advantage of making the legally relevant 
inquiry a determination of the specific meaning of a discrete communication, 
a commission we might think both trial and appellate judges are well suited 
to undertake. Speculative judgments about predicted consequences and 
speaker intentions are rendered unnecessary, a happy outcome for disputes in 
which political passions and prejudices are likely to be in play. Moreover, 
Hand’s approach has a categorical quality that serves the objective of giving 
unpopular speakers a “safe harbor” of legal immunity: they pretty much know 
in advance what they can and cannot say.8 Holmes’s test, in contrast, seems 
better to track the legitimate reasons a liberal government might have for 
wanting to regulate speech: principally, the prevention of material harm. 
Under Hand’s test, a speaker can deliberately cause serious harm and yet 
escape legal liability by influencing audiences with carefully worded albeit 
incendiary observations that fall short of specific, operational appeals to 
interest or duty. 
Thus, Holmes’s test comes across as less vulnerable to abuse by speakers 
bent on mischief, while Hand’s test seems to be less vulnerable to abuse by 
judges and juries bent on scapegoating controversial or strident but probably 
inconsequential speakers. The Holmes and Hand approaches to justifying and 
demarcating the freedom of speech can be compared—and usually are—with 
dominant attention to such practical matters as risks of abuse, problems of 
proof, judicial capability, fair notice of legal vulnerability, common 
understanding, and fit with standard regulatory motivations.9 But that is to 
conduct the comparison on Holmes’s terms. It is to miss much of what Hand 
has to say. 
What is most notable about the Masses opinion is the way it proceeds from 
the premise that a certain kind of speech, what Hand terms “hostile criticism,” 
is not just something the country can endure, but rather something the country 
must have if political authority is to derive from the consent of the governed, 
a requisite of the constitutional regime’s explicit (“We the People”) 
                                                                                                                            
 7. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 133–34 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
 8. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 726. 
 9. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or 
Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209. 
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commitment to popular sovereignty.10 The various elaborations, 
qualifications, and implications which Hand develops from that premise 
constitute potentially his most important contribution regarding the freedom 
of speech. It is a contribution that has been marginalized by Hand’s 
misfortune to be cast by subsequent generations as Holmes’s foil, made to 
debate on Holmes’s turf, where experience is exalted and both logic and 
political theory devalued. My aim here is to enumerate some of Hand’s 
neglected ideas—ideas of broader and deeper significance than the question 
of which judge identified the more workable or intuitively appealing test for 
delimiting the freedom of speech. 
FIRST  
Hand treats the freedom of speech not as a personal right against the 
majority but rather as a procedure essential to constituting a legitimate 
majority. 
Like Holmes, Hand was a rights skeptic. His constitutional philosophy, 
much influenced by his Harvard Law School teacher James Bradley Thayer,11 
was centered on the quest to liberate majority rule from special interests and 
demagogic influence. As a young New York practicing lawyer, Hand 
published an article in the Harvard Law Review savaging the majority 
opinion in Lochner v. New York12 for its ungrounded, expansive, anti-
democratic invention of an employer’s constitutional right to be free from 
legislative limits on working hours and conditions.13 His extravagant 
admiration for Holmes was partly a product of the latter’s now legendary 
dissent in that case. 
Because of their general skepticism regarding the place of rights in a 
regime of popular sovereignty, both Hand and Holmes faced a dilemma 
during and shortly after World War I when confronted with claims by 
dissident speakers that prosecutions under the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 
1918 violated the First Amendment. Both judges were appalled by the 
zealous persecution of dissenters that wartime passions unleashed, but they 
                                                                                                                            
 10. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  
 11. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 50–52 (1994). 
 12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 13. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 
502–04 (1908). 
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were committed to a view of rights and the judicial role that constrained their 
capacity as judges to confront the injustice.14 
Hand’s solution to this dilemma was nothing short of brilliant. He decided 
that the foundational principle of majority rule could be served—not 
violated—by protecting speakers because freedom of speech is not really a 
right against the ruling majority so much as a component of the very process 
that defines and enables majority rule. It is a majoritarian procedure, not an 
anti-majoritarian individual right. Only consent to government actions and 
policies that is generated in the face of hostile criticism is genuinely 
authoritative in a regime of popular sovereignty, he concluded. As such, the 
principle of freedom of speech operates not only as a constitutional basis for 
striking down a speech-restricting statute such as the Espionage Act of 1917 
but also as a starting point for interpreting such a statute. So a reading of the 
statute should be undertaken with an eye to preserving “that right to criticize 
either by temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and indecent invective, 
which is normally the privilege of the individual in countries dependent upon 
the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority.”15 
This felt need to protect essential, authority-conferring free speech led 
Hand to embrace, as a matter of creative statutory interpretation in the spirit 
of constitutional avoidance, a distinction that he considered to be 
fundamental as a matter of basic democratic theory. “[T]he normal 
assumption of democratic government,” he asserts in his Masses opinion, is 
that “the suppression of hostile criticism does not turn upon the justice of its 
substance or the decency and propriety of its temper.”16 Government 
evaluations, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, of the substance or 
temper of speech cannot determine which utterances are legally permissible.17 
However, that does not mean that all speech is beyond the reach of legitimate 
regulation. “[T]here has always been a recognized limit to” “the free 
utterance of abuse and criticism of the existing law,” Hand notes, “incident 
indeed to the existence of any compulsive power of the state itself.”18 This 
“recognized limit” formed the basis for the operative standard he read into 
the Espionage Act of 1917: 
                                                                                                                            
 14. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 537–43; see also David S. Bogen, The Free Speech 
Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 141–42 (1982) (explaining that 
“a fundamental tenet of Holmes’s creed was that the judge should not impose his personal values 
on society”).  
 15. Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 539. 
 16. Id. at 540. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands. 
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, 
and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law 
cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public 
opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic 
state.19 
Notice that Hand derives this limit not by means of balancing benefits and 
costs within the categories of speech he is considering, nor by invoking the 
practical advantages of the line he draws. Rather, he tries to determine which 
categories of speech serve an essential function in generating meaningful 
consent to the creation of governmental authority. 
With characteristic intellectual candor, Hand admitted in subsequent 
private correspondence with the noted First Amendment scholar Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., that his preference for a test based on the meaning of the speaker’s 
statement rather than the predicted consequences of the utterance or the 
objectives of the speaker does not follow ineluctably from his insistence that 
the way to understand the freedom of speech is to ask what speech is essential 
to creating majoritarian government authority.20 Were it not for predictable 
abuses in administration, he told Chafee, “[t]he chance that the State would 
lose any valuable opinion by suppressing those whose purpose was to 
produce a violation of law, while they kept on the safe side of counselling it, 
seems to me much too thin for practical estimate.”21 So the practicalities of 
administration and proof did matter to Hand, but only because they have a 
bearing on identifying which speech serves the function of facilitating 
majority rule. 
One could disagree with Hand’s judgment regarding which categories of 
speech serve the function of constituting democratic authority and still 
believe he was asking the correct question. For example, Dr. Martin Luther 
King’s call in his historic Letter From Birmingham Jail for the violation of 
demonstrably unjust racial segregation ordinances, to be undertaken openly 
in the spirit of peaceful protest and with no effort to evade punishment, would 
seem to qualify as the counseling of violation of law but also as hostile 
criticism that constitutes a legitimate test for a regime that claims to be based 
on popular sovereignty.22 Perhaps under his own theoretical rationale Judge 
Hand needed to subdivide and treat differently various calls for the violation 
                                                                                                                            
 19. Id. 
 20. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765. 
 21. Id. at 766. 
 22. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted in 26 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 835, 837–41 (1993).  
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of law, something he failed to do in the Masses opinion. Even were that so, 
his underlying theory would not be discredited. 
There is reason to believe that Hand’s focus on how democratic authority 
is constituted derived from his reading of a book, The Promise of American 
Life, written by his good friend and New Hampshire summer neighbor, 
Herbert Croly.23 That book, published in 1909, created a buzz among 
intellectually-inclined Progressives.24 Hand loved it, spent many hours and 
letters discussing it with Croly, and did all he could to get others, including 
Theodore Roosevelt, to read it.25 Roosevelt’s third-party Bull Moose 
presidential campaign in 1912 drew upon several of Croly’s ideas.26 
One thing a twenty-first century reader of the book is bound to find 
striking is the degree to which Croly integrates his understanding of the rights 
and duties of individual citizens into the quest for a collective democratic 
spirit. Much of the book is devoted to unpacking the idea of popular 
sovereignty.27 Croly maintains that a certain kind of collective will is integral 
to the concept: “The People are not Sovereign as individuals. They are not 
Sovereign in reason and morals even when united into a majority. They 
become Sovereign only in so far as they succeed in reaching and expressing 
a collective purpose.”28 
He also recognizes that forging and sustaining such a collective purpose 
is an ongoing challenge: “Undesirable and inadequate forms of democracy 
always seek to dispense in one way or another with this tedious process of 
achieving a morally authoritative Sovereign will.”29 Croly is not as clear as 
he needs to be about how a large, diverse population spread out over a 
continent can have a collective purpose, but he appears to accord major roles 
to trust, fair procedure, national identity, and moral aspiration. He invokes a 
duty “of dealing towards one’s fellow-countrymen in good faith, so that 
                                                                                                                            
 23. Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant 
Application of the Sherman Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 312–13 (2013). 
 24. See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951, 
978–79 (1996) (“[The Promise of American Life] was widely praised by . . . progressive 
intellectuals . . . .”); see also CHARLES FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM CROLY, WEYL, 
LIPPMANN, AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900–1925, at 121 (1961) (“[The Promise of American 
Life was] a significant part of the progressive movement.”). 
 25. See GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 195–97.  
 26. Id. at 190–202. 
 27. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 84–86, 176–78, 223–24, 265–
66, 269–70, 279–81 (1965). 
 28. Id. at 280. 
 29. Id. at 281. 
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differences of interest, of conviction, and of moral purpose can be made the 
agency of a better understanding and a firmer loyalty.”30 
More than biographical details about their friendship suggests that Hand 
was influenced by Croly. In an article he published in the Harvard Law 
Review the year before he wrote the Masses opinion (and seven years after he 
read and touted The Promise of American Life), Hand discussed with 
unmistakably Crolyesque resonance how law relates to collective will: 
The law must have an authority supreme over the will of the 
individual, and such an authority can arise only from a background 
of social acquiescence, which gives it the voice of indefinitely 
greater numbers than those of its expositors. Thus, the law surpasses 
the deliverances of even the most exalted of its prophets; the 
momentum of its composite will alone makes it effective to coerce 
the individual and reconciles him to his subserviency.31 
Because law is at bottom a manifestation of the collective will, “it must be 
content to lag behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it the 
weight of such general acceptance as will give sanction to its pretension to 
unquestioned dictation.”32  
Nevertheless, 
It is not as the priests of a completed revelation that the living 
successors of past lawmakers can most truly show their reverence 
or continue the traditions which they affect to regard. . . . Only as 
an articulate organ of the half-understood aspirations of living men, 
constantly recasting and adapting existing forms, bringing to the 
high light of expression the dumb impulses of the present, can they 
continue in the course of the ancestors whom they revere.33 
Legal interpretation must be dynamic as well as disciplined and deferential 
because  
no human purpose possesses itself so completely in advance as to 
admit of final definition. Life overflows its moulds and the will 
outstrips its own universals. Men cannot know their own meaning 
till the variety of its manifestations is disclosed in its final impacts, 
and the full content of no design is grasped till it has got beyond its 
                                                                                                                            
 30. Id. at 286. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 232–42 
(1997), for a lucid account of how Croly’s understanding of popular sovereignty bears on the 
freedom of speech. 
 31. Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618 (1916). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 618–19. 
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general formulation and become differentiated in its last 
incidence.34 
Hand might as well have entitled his article “The Promise of American Law.” 
Perhaps Judge Hand’s most revealing explanation for why he valued the 
freedom of speech mainly for its contribution to the enrichment of collective 
opinion appears in brief remarks he made in 1944, two weeks prior to D-Day, 
upon administering the oath of citizenship to 150,000 newly-naturalized 
immigrants gathered in Central Park.35 With over a million of their fellow 
citizens in attendance,36 Hand told the new Americans:  
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, 
no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there, it needs no 
constitution, no law, no court to save it.37 
Because liberty, like law, lies in public sentiment rather than formal 
enactments, claimants and defenders of liberty must attend more than 
anything else to how public opinion is formed. 
SECOND 
He derives his understanding of the relationship between free speech and 
the creation of legitimate government authority from the common 
assumptions of regimes that are founded on the principle of popular 
sovereignty. 
In Masses Hand invokes authority in defense of his theory but it is not the 
authority of judicial precedent, or a particular law-creating action, or the 
intentions of specific lawgivers, or what may have been the common 
understanding of his own political community at a particular moment in time. 
Rather, he invokes the authority of what is “normally” guaranteed in 
“countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate 
source of authority.”38 Or again, he rests his case on the authority of “the 
normal assumption of democratic government” and what “in normal times is 
a safeguard of free government.”39 In effect, his argument is that the 
                                                                                                                            
 34. Id. at 620. 
 35. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 548. 
 36. See id. 
 37. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 2d ed. 1953). 
 38. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 39. Id. at 540. 
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Espionage Act of 1917 and, as his subsequent correspondence makes clear 
even the First Amendment itself, should be interpreted with reference to what 
are the requisites of the general form of government to which the nation is 
committed.40 In the case of the United States, that is an electoral republic of 
limited powers based on the principle of popular sovereignty. This 
understanding of the kind of authority that matters most enables Hand and 
those who would follow him to debate controversial questions of 
interpretation with a focus on vital functions, objectives, structures, and 
relationships, that is, features relating to the ongoing distribution of power 
and trust that go to the heart of whether a government should be considered 
a republic, with all that term implies about political responsiveness, energy, 
adaptation, and resilience. Notably missing from Hand’s Masses opinion are 
appeals to free-standing textual language or precedent. 
It is interesting that with the help of a skillful lawyer in the Masses case, 
Gilbert Roe, Hand may have derived his understanding of the proper sources 
of authority from James Madison, the principal author of the First 
Amendment. Roe was the attorney who initiated the Masses litigation on 
behalf of the magazine, seeking to enjoin the New York Postmaster’s denial 
of mailing privileges for the August 1917 issue.41 Earlier that year Roe had 
testified before Congress in opposition to passage of the Espionage Act.42 In 
his testimony, he analogized the proposed law to the infamous Sedition Act 
of 1798.43 He called attention to James Madison’s detailed contention in his 
Virginia Report of 1800 that the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment.44 
Available records do not tell us what arguments Roe made to Judge Hand in 
the District Court, but in defending Hand’s ruling in Masses before the 
Second Circuit, Roe’s brief placed heavy emphasis on Madison’s argument 
                                                                                                                            
 40. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 725–26, 765–66 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, 
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law 
Sch. (Jan. 8, 1920)). 
 41. Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 537.   
 42. Espionage and Inference with Neutrality: Hearings on H.R. 291 Before H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 36–42, 62–63 (1917) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Gilbert E. 
Roe, Esq., Representative, The Free Speech League).   
 43. Id. For an account of Roe’s testimony by his biographer, see ERIC B. EASTON, 
DEFENDING THE MASSES: A PROGRESSIVE LAWYER’S BATTLES FOR FREE SPEECH 128 (2017). 
Regarding Roe’s testimony analogizing the Espionage Act to the Sedition Act of 1798, which 
provoked Madison’s Virginia Report, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the 
Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 351 (2003). 
 44. Compare Hearings, supra note 42, at 36–42, with JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE 
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800), reprinted in WRITINGS 608 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
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in the Virginia Report.45 Two years later, when the Espionage Act of 1917 
was under review before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Debs 
v. United States, Roe submitted an amicus brief which invoked Madison in 
similar fashion to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.46 
If Roe did indeed construct his argument before Judge Hand the same way 
he tried to persuade Congress, the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court 
that punishing explicit, strongly worded war criticism violates a proper 
understanding of the freedom of speech, it is not surprising that in his Masses 
opinion Hand would make his main source of interpretative authority the 
national constitutional commitment to the republican form of government 
founded on the principle of popular sovereignty. For that is exactly what 
Madison did in his Virginia Report, so heavily emphasized in all of Roe’s 
various challenges to the Espionage Act.47 
Madison famously, if not always consistently, maintained that 
interpretation of the Constitution should be based on the understanding of its 
provisions that prevailed at the state ratification conventions whose assent 
made the Constitution positive law, or the state legislatures whose 
ratifications of subsequent amendments gave those provisions constitutional 
status.48 In that regard, the intentions of drafters of constitutional clauses or 
amendments (such as Madison himself) were legally relevant, he thought, 
only insofar as they informed the understandings of the ratifiers.49 Staying 
true to the ratifiers is not a simple interpretative undertaking, however, given 
the paucity of records regarding the deliberations of the ratifying bodies, not 
to mention the difficulty as a general matter of determining such a thing as 
the collective understanding of a multi-member body, particularly about 
contentious questions considered by all the actors to be historically 
consequential. Madison appreciated the limits of textual content as a window 
into enactor will better than most; his Federalist No. 37 is a succinct 
disquisition on the subject.50 So it is instructive to track how he went about in 
the Virginia Report to argue that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First 
                                                                                                                            
 45. See generally Brief of Complainant-Appellee, Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 
(2d Cir. 1917) (No. 123). 
 46. See generally Brief of Gilbert E. Roe as Amicus Curiae, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919) (No. 714). 
 47. See MADISON, supra note 44, at 644–58. 
 48. For a careful account of how in different constitutional controversies Madison treated 
this question of whose understanding is authoritative, see JEREMY D. BAILEY, JAMES MADISON 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERFECTION 150–59 (2015). 
 49. See id. at 151. 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
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Amendment, and how much his interpretative method has in common with 
Judge Hand’s in the Masses case.51 
Madison begins his argument by asserting that the “freedom of the press” 
specified in the First Amendment cannot have been understood by the 
ratifiers to be coextensive with the English common law concept of press 
freedom.52 This is because, unlike in Britain, in the United States “[t]he 
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.”53 A free press 
serves an entirely different function in the American republic from what it 
does in Britain, where both the crown and one branch of the legislature are 
hereditary rather than elective and “the danger of encroachments on the rights 
of the people is understood to be confined to the executive magistrate.”54 
Indeed, in Britain “[t]he representatives of the people in the legislature, are 
not only exempt themselves, from distrust, but are considered as sufficient 
guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the 
executive.”55 In the United States, by contrast, “the executive magistrates are 
not held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be omnipotent; and both, being 
elective, are both responsible.”56 These fundamental differences between the 
two regimes (one of which did not qualify as a republic by his measure) in 
sovereignty, trust, and accountability led Madison to ask, rhetorically: “Is it 
not natural and necessary, under such different circumstances, that a different 
degree of freedom, in the use of the press, should be contemplated?”57 
Then, after sketching the political pressures and deliberations that led to 
the decision to amend the Constitution by adding a Bill of Rights including 
the First Amendment, Madison makes the following intriguing observation 
about the proper sources of authority: 
But the question does not turn either on the wisdom of the 
Constitution or on the policy which gave rise to its particular 
organization. It turns on the actual meaning of the instrument; by 
which it has appeared, that a power over the press is clearly 
excluded, from the number of powers delegated to the federal 
government.58 
                                                                                                                            
 51. MADISON, supra note 44, at 608–662.  
 52. MADISON, supra note 44, at 644. 
 53. Id. at 645. 
 54. Id. at 645–46.  
 55. Id. at 645.  
 56. Id. at 646. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 651. 
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Some interpreters might think that the history, both outdoors and indoors, of 
adoption might be a key to discerning “actual meaning,” but Madison quickly 
makes clear that for him actual meaning is to be found in the structure of 
accountability manifested in the document. 
We know this in part by the way he describes the rights and—
importantly—the duties that are “secured”59 (not created) by the First 
Amendment. He accords equal status in his analysis to “the freedom of the 
press,”60 “th[e] right of freely examining public characters and measures, and 
of . . . communication . . . thereon,”61 and “the right of electing the members 
of the government,”62 despite the fact that only the first right appears in the 
text of the Amendment. He never discusses the meaning of “the freedom of 
speech.” Furthermore, his framing the interpretative inquiry in terms of 
delegated and reserved powers signals Madison’s premise that for him the 
First Amendment is principally about popular sovereignty and limited, 
accountable government, not free-standing rights as such. It is about the 
functioning of republican government. Consequently, it is to be interpreted, 
he strongly implies, by determining which understandings of rights and duties 
are most consonant with the premises, procedures, and objectives of 
republican government. His search for “actual meaning” centers on the effort 
to understand the structures, relationships, responsibilities, and purposes 
enacted by the constitutional text. 
Madison next sets out in the Virginia Report how the Constitution itself, 
including as amended in 1791, assumes that the officers of government “may 
not discharge their trusts,” that when that happens “they should be brought 
into contempt or disrepute,” that such an accountability generates “the duty 
as well as the right of intelligent and faithful citizens” to control miscreant 
officials “by the censorship of the public opinion,” so as to “promote a 
remedy according to the rules of the Constitution,” to which end free 
elections serve as chief among “the great remedial rights of the people.”63 He 
elaborates: 
[T]he right of electing the members of the government, constitutes 
more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. 
The value and efficacy of this right, depends on the knowledge of 
the . . . merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust; and 
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on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing 
these merits and demerits . . . respectively.64 
Madison believed in natural rights and based his constitutional 
understanding upon their existence,65 in that respect differing mightily from 
Hand.66 In matters of legal interpretation, Madison may also have accorded 
more significance to formal enactment in preference to organic development 
than did Hand, the quintessential common law judge.67 Nevertheless, it is 
striking how much Hand’s analysis in Masses replicates Madison’s method 
of reasoning from the commitment to popular sovereignty in its republican 
form to establish the centrality of public opinion in the constitutional scheme. 
Like Madison, Hand does that specifically to determine what opportunities 
citizens must have to scrutinize and criticize their governors. Whether or not 
he was influenced by actually having read the Virginia Report, Hand’s 
employment of an interpretative method not unlike Madison’s is a 
noteworthy feature of the Masses opinion. 
THIRD 
He concludes from republican theory that the most problematic kind of 
regulation of speech is that which turns on the viewpoint expressed by the 
speaker. 
In the Masses opinion, Hand does not elaborate upon the popular 
sovereignty theory he invokes. But in a fascinating letter he wrote to 
Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. twenty-nine months later, he supplemented 
his analysis in a way that anticipated the eventual course of modern First 
Amendment doctrine, particularly the singling out of “viewpoint 
discrimination” as the quintessential regulatory wrong: 
                                                                                                                            
 64. Id. at 655. 
 65. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON & THE FOUNDING 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 92–93 (1998); COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT 
OF REPUBLICAN SELF-GOVERNMENT 83 (2009); Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of 
Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245 (1990). 
 66. In a letter to Zechariah Chafee, Hand colorfully expressed his deflationary view of rights 
as serving procedural efficiency rather than fundamental entitlement. See Gunther, supra note 5, 
at 769–71 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 2, 1921)) (“On the whole I believe that 
while the justification for freedom of speech is public enlightenment, historically the ‘right,’—
though I join you in hating the word,—is vested in the speaker constitutionally, and our 
legislatures can engage ad lib. in obscurantism, provided they don’t infringe on an individual who 
can cry out.”). 
 67. Admittedly, it is inevitably a stretch to compare the jurisprudential commitments of a 
person operating in an incipient legal regime with another operating in a mature one. 
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[A]ny state which professes to be controlled by public opinion, 
cannot take sides against any opinion except that which must 
express itself in the violation of law. On the contrary, it must regard 
all other expressions of opinion as tolerable, if not good. As soon as 
it does not, it inevitably assumes that one opinion may control in 
spite of what might become an opposite opinion. It becomes a State 
based upon some opinion, as against any opinion which may get 
itself accepted. . . . 
If so, nothing short of counsel to violate law should be itself 
illegal.68 
Although Hand has never received credit for introducing possibly both the 
earliest and the best defense of the now-dominant principle against viewpoint 
discrimination, no doubt in large part because his defense surfaced only in 
private correspondence, his justification is notable for its powerful theoretical 
grounding. The great weight that current doctrine accords to whether the 
applicability of a regulation of speech or its justification turns on the 
viewpoint advanced by the speaker usually is explained in terms of possible 
distortion of public debate or possible revelation of an illicit regulatory 
purpose. Many years ago Geoffrey Stone developed these rationales and they 
have figured prominently in academic inquiry ever since.69 Recently, James 
Weinstein has suggested that government discrimination on the basis of 
viewpoint fails to accord individual speakers the equal dignity and respect to 
which they are entitled, either as persons or more narrowly as citizens.70 
Hand’s rationale for the principle against viewpoint discrimination has 
certain advantages over those proffered by Stone and his many followers or 
Weinstein. Their explanations depend to a considerable extent on claims 
regarding either what amounts to a “distortion” of public debate, or how illicit 
purpose can be inferred from the form a regulation takes, or what it means to 
treat persons equally. All of these are worthy inquiries in evaluating the 
exercise of state power, but they are questions that are likely to engender a 
wide range of answers. Hand’s rationale depends on a claim that will seem to 
many less disputable. His premise is that popular sovereignty embodied in 
the republican form of government requires, above all else, that the exercise 
                                                                                                                            
 68. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. 
Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 8, 
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 69. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189, 198, 227 (1983); see also Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. 
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 70. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST. 
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of government authority be responsive to public opinion, if not reflexively 
and rapidly in response to shocks and fevers, at least in due course and 
continually.71 Viewpoint discrimination is problematic, according to Hand, 
because it contravenes the republican commitment that law and policy, like 
human understanding, be open-ended, capable of adapting to changing 
conditions.72 
Arguably the most consequential issue of First Amendment interpretation 
currently is whether the principle against viewpoint discrimination should be 
extended to create a strong presumption against forms of regulation that take 
into account the subject matter of the speech (e.g., for whom to vote, what to 
buy, where to go to attend an event), the legal status of the speaker (e.g., 
foreign national, economic entity, civil servant, prisoner, non-adult), or the 
function served by the speech (e.g., persuasion, transmission of information, 
intimidation, signaling solidarity, teaching a skill). The omnibus term 
“content regulation” typically is employed to encompass this set of disparate 
variables. Taking into account subject matter, speaker identity, or speech 
function surely can be a means of practicing viewpoint discrimination 
surreptitiously. But often those variables are treated as relevant for legitimate 
reasons that have little to do with viewpoint discrimination. Consider labeling 
requirements, libel law, and punishment for fraud. Hand’s distinctive 
justification for the principle against viewpoint discrimination has 
implications for whether viewpoint regulation should be conflated with 
content regulation in the formulation of First Amendment doctrine as a 
general matter, or only upon proof or good reason to suspect that in the 
particular instance considering content was a cover for punishing viewpoint.73 
Compared with the other rationales for treating viewpoint discrimination 
to be the quintessential violation of the First Amendment, Hand’s 
justification based on the conceptual impossibility of a republic being “a State 
based upon some opinion” provides less reason to lump viewpoint and 
content regulation together. In terms of conceptual coherence, it is not the 
case that a republic the laws of which make relevant the subject matter or 
                                                                                                                            
 71. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765. In recent years, Dean Post has emphasized this type 
of responsiveness as a defining dimension of popular sovereignty, tracing the idea to Madison. 
See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
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97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011). 
 72. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765. 
 73. This precise question is debated in an exchange between Justice Thomas, for the 
majority, and Justice Kagan, concurring, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). For 
a comprehensive analysis of that debate and its doctrinal implications see Genevieve Lakier, Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. 
CT. REV. 233. 
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function of a communication or the status of the speaker thereby becomes 
founded upon “some opinion.” True, if in a particular instance those non-
viewpoint considerations are used to select for viewpoint under the table, the 
conceptual difficulty invoked by Hand kicks in. The State then is indeed 
basing its exercise of authority “upon some opinion, as against any opinion 
which may get itself accepted.” But if the principal function of the freedom 
of speech is to legitimate and facilitate majority rule, as Hand maintained, it 
would raise a different kind of conceptual problem to leverage this occasional 
phenomenon of surreptitious viewpoint discrimination into a wholesale 
prohibition against regulators employing coverage criteria relating to subject 
matter, speaker identity, or speech function. Such criteria routinely have been 
utilized by republican regimes to make their laws closely track their policy 
justifications and operate no more broadly or intrusively than necessary. Both 
dimensions of fit, we might think, are defining features of limited, 
accountable government. In this respect, Hand’s distinctive understanding of 
the freedom of speech as conceptually integrated with the project of 
republican governance has implications for how large the footprint of the 
First Amendment can be without contradicting its own raison d’etre. 
Of course, the test that Hand derived from his republican premise has an 
honored place for one kind of viewpoint discrimination, punishment of a 
speaker for telling his audience that it is in their interest or is their duty to 
violate the law.74 Why this exception to what is asserted to be a fundamental 
general principle? Did Hand simply find it necessary to identify some 
category of speech which is punishable so as not to appear “absolutist” in a 
doctrinaire sort of way? That explanation is implausible not only because 
Hand had the courage of his convictions, but also because even if he had felt 
some need to find limits to speaker freedom nothing in his analysis forced 
him to employ viewpoint in preference to other possible sources of limitation. 
I believe that Hand derived his exception from the same foundational 
commitment from which he derived his general disallowance of viewpoint 
discrimination: popular sovereignty. Just as popular sovereignty embodies 
the authority of emergent, nascent, and potential majorities, it embodies the 
authority of currently prevailing majorities. This last type of majority must 
not entrench itself but must be allowed to rule, and that allowance entails a 
minimum respect for the authority of law on the part of all those who aspire 
to rule in the future by altering public opinion and gaining political control. 
Stirring up fierce discontent with existing rulers, policies, and practices is 
consistent with such respect for the authority of law, but telling persons it is 
in their interest or is their duty to violate the law as it currently stands is not. 
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Or so an adherent to Hand’s understanding of dynamic popular sovereignty 
in a republic might believe. 
In fact, Hand’s exception to his general disallowance of viewpoint 
discrimination echoes a distinction Herbert Croly drew in The Promise of 
American Life.75 A nation’s sovereign will, according to Croly, “increases 
with the increasing power of its citizens to deal fairly and to feel loyally 
towards their fellow-countrymen.”76 Although the “responsibility and loyalty 
which the citizens of a democratic nation must feel towards one another is 
comprehensive and unmitigable,” particular laws “will be welcome to some 
citizens and obnoxious to others.”77 Those in the latter category “have every 
right and should be permitted every opportunity to protest in the most 
vigorous and persistent manner.”78 This is how the bond essential to having a 
collective sovereign will is preserved in the face of conflicting interests and 
opinions. But the bond, according to Croly, is a two-way street: “The nation 
may, however, on its part demand that these protests, in order to be heeded 
and respected, must conform to certain conditions. They must not be carried 
to the point of refusing obedience to the law.”79 
Croly does not say in so many words that protests must not be carried to 
the point of advocating as well as practicing disobedience to law, but his 
argument from reciprocity would support such an extension. And Judge Hand 
may well have found this part of a book he knew well to be of interest, 
especially because its author was so focused on trying to understand and 
unpack the concept of popular sovereignty. 
FOURTH 
He does not require that speech meet a standard of decorum or 
reasonableness in order to be protected. 
Croly found that the commitment to popular sovereignty entails a right of 
dissenters to “protest in the most vigorous and persistent manner” consistent 
with the correlative duty to obey the laws in place until they are altered by 
democratic means.80 Hand outdid Croly in validating aggressive dissent. The 
Masses opinion explicitly extends its protection to “immoderate and indecent 
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 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 285–86.  
 79. Id. at 286. 
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invective,”81 arguments “trivial in substance, and violent and perverse in 
manner,”82 “intemperate and inflammatory public discussion,”83 “hostile 
criticism” which falls outside “the range of temperate argument,”84 “free 
utterance of abuse and criticism,”85 the arousal of “passions” by means of 
“[p]olitical agitation,”86 and the writings of a magazine “which attacks with 
the utmost violence the draft and the war.”87 
Were Hand elaborating a free-standing individual right grounded in a 
conception of inviolable personhood, the freedom to express hostility in an 
intemperate, indecent, abusive manner might seem to be implied. But why 
should the freedom of speech understood as a procedure for facilitating 
popular sovereignty in a collective and constructive sense extend to the kind 
of hostile, inflammatory agitation that Hand goes out of his way almost to 
celebrate in Masses? 
James Madison confronted this very question when he developed in the 
Virginia Report the argument that the commitment to popular sovereignty 
entails the protection of speech critical of public characters and measures. In 
response to the argument of defenders of the Sedition Act of 1798 that it only 
punished malicious writings published with the intent to defame officials, 
bring them into contempt or disrepute, or excite hatred against them, Madison 
said: 
Should it happen, as the [C]onstitution supposes it may happen, that 
either of these branches of the government, may not have duly 
discharged its trust; it is natural and proper, that according to the 
cause and degree of their faults, they should be brought into 
contempt or disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people.88 
As discussed above, Hand may or may not have been urged by counsel in 
Masses to consult the Virginia Report, but whatever the truth of the matter is 
on that point, it is noteworthy that even a thinker so concerned about the 
quality of public debate as Madison should have seen a constructive role for 
angry, disrespectful speech in the forging of a sovereign public opinion. 
John Stuart Mill also addressed the question of how decorum figures in 
the freedom of speech. In On Liberty, published in 1859, Mill expressed the 
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view that in principle the maintenance of high standards of fairness and 
rationality in public debate would advance the search for progress in wide-
ranging understanding.89 (Such progress was his priority; Mill was not 
exploring the sources of political authority.) But then he explained how 
demands for discursive decency play out in practice: 
With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, 
namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the 
denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it 
were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is 
only desired to restrain the employment of them against the 
prevailing opinion . . . .90 
When those who defend prevailing opinions resort to “unmeasured 
vituperation” against their opponents, they are greeted not with sanctions or 
criticism but rather “the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.”91 
This pattern of selective insistence on temperate argument led Mill to 
conclude that “law and authority have no business” enforcing a decorum of 
public disputation.92 Mill’s point about imbalance and prejudice in 
administration would seem to have even more purchase in Hand’s political 
process justification for the freedom of speech than it does in Mill’s 
justification based on general enlightenment and societal progress. 
In the Masses opinion, Hand’s pattern throughout is to mention the 
impropriety of any kind of decorum requirement virtually every time he 
describes the freedom at issue. That indicates how strongly he was committed 
to the proposition. However, he never explains in the least detail the basis for 
this view. He does say explicitly in Masses that the legal standard cannot 
properly embody a demand for a “general tenor and animus” or a “general 
ethos” because “[t]he tradition of English-speaking freedom has depended in 
no small part upon the merely procedural requirement that the state point with 
exactness to just that conduct which violates the law.”93 It is hard to imagine 
a decorum standard that could meet this requirement. If this concern best 
explains Hand’s rejection of decorum as a limiting principle in free speech 
disputes, the Masses opinion anticipates Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
memorable dictum in Cohen v. California, affirming the right to use four-
letter words in public: “it is largely because governmental officials cannot 
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make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters 
of taste and style so largely to the individual.”94 
FIFTH 
He assumes that sedition is never a legitimate ground for regulating speech. 
Hand says in Masses that a finding that a magazine’s writing is 
“subversive to authority and seditious in effect” does not constitute a 
sufficient basis for denying it mailing privileges.95 Earlier in the opinion he 
maintains that his creative reading of the Espionage Act of 1917 is necessary 
to prevent the statute from providing that “every political agitation which can 
be shown to . . . create a seditious temper is illegal.”96 In a different paragraph 
he specifies that statements which “arouse a seditious disposition” without 
directly advocating law violation “would not be enough” to justify 
punishment.97 In these three different passages rejecting sedition as a 
regulatory rationale, Hand can be read to anticipate the Supreme Court’s 
landmark opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan declaring “the central 
meaning of the First Amendment” to be the rejection of the very concept of 
seditious libel.98 
The Sullivan case held that under the First Amendment speakers cannot 
be held liable for defaming public figures unless their factual errors are in 
effect deliberate.99 That ruling transformed libel law, but as Professor Harry 
Kalven, Jr. explained in an article that has become a classic, the Court’s 
reasoning was even more dramatic than its holding: 
The Court did not simply, in the face of an awkward history, 
definitively put to rest the status of the Sedition Act. More 
important, it found in the controversy over seditious libel the clue 
to “the central meaning of the First Amendment.” The choice of 
language was unusually apt. The Amendment has a “central 
meaning”—a core of protection of speech without which 
democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison’s phrase, 
“the censorial power” would be in the Government over the people 
and not “in the people over the Government.” This is not the whole 
meaning of the Amendment. There are other freedoms protected by 
it. But at the center there is no doubt what speech is being protected 
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and no doubt why it is being protected. The theory of the freedom 
of speech clause was put right side up for the first time.100 
Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan quoted heavily 
from Madison’s Virginia Report, as did Professor Herbert Wechsler’s brief 
on behalf of the New York Times.101 Today, for a court to invoke Madison in 
a First Amendment case is hardly noteworthy.102 But at the time of the Masses 
decision, Madison was pretty much forgotten as an authority about the 
freedoms of speech and press. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
Virginia Report was utilized in debates over state sovereignty and 
nullification, but its discussion of the First Amendment was all but ignored. 
Then came Gilbert Roe. 
I had occasion to ask Professor Wechsler, who for several years was my 
colleague on the Columbia Law faculty, whether in preparing his historic 
brief in the Sullivan case he was aware of the way Gilbert Roe had resurrected 
Madison’s Virginia Report in arguing against the Espionage Act of 1917 in 
the Masses and Debs cases. He was. 
By no means does Judge Hand deserve the credit that Gilbert Roe, Herbert 
Wechsler, and Justice William Brennan (or for that matter, Harry Kalven) do 
in the saga that led to the fundamental rejection of seditious libel as an 
American legal concept. In the Masses opinion, Hand’s treatment of the 
modern status of seditious libel occurs only in passing and only in the form 
of an unexplained assumption. But Hand is part of the story in that he was the 
first judge to do even that much, and he proved to be on the right side of 
history. 
SIXTH 
He formulates a governing test with emphasis on how well it will function 
during periods of unusual public anxiety when toleration is at a low ebb 
and dissenters are most vulnerable to being made scapegoats. 
In the same letter to Zechariah Chafee in which Hand maintained that 
viewpoint regulation is problematic because it is a premise of republican 
government that a state cannot be “based upon some opinion, as against any 
opinion which may get itself accepted,” he observed that it is mainly in “times 
of excitement” when fear and prejudice are at their peak that “the freedom of 
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speech becomes important as an institution.”103 He told Chafee that his 
preference for a qualitative test extending absolute protection to all advocacy 
that stops short of asserting a duty or interest to violate the law was driven by 
his skepticism about how a more flexible test requiring judgment, prediction, 
or inference would be administered in periods of unusual public anxiety.104 In 
a subsequent letter to Chafee he elaborated: 
I own I should prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, 
difficult to evade. If it could become sacred by the incrustations of 
time and precedent it might be made to serve just a little to withhold 
the torrents of passion to which I suspect democracies will be found 
more subject than for example the whig autocracy of the 18th 
century.105 
In Hand’s earlier correspondence with Holmes, this theme surfaced as 
well. Hand spoke of the need to “moderate the storms of popular feeling”106 
and “get over the existing hysteria.”107 He lamented to Holmes that “the merry 
sport of Red-baiting goes on, and the pack gives tongue more and more 
shrilly.”108 He owned “to a sense of dismay at the increase in all the symptoms 
of apparent panic.”109 
Hand’s priority he made clear. It is in these unusual periods—periods I 
have elsewhere labeled “pathological”110—that the freedom of speech matters 
most. But what exactly does that imply about how the First Amendment and 
other pertinent laws should be interpreted? In Masses and in his 
correspondence and academic writing during the World War I period, Hand 
suggested a few answers to this question. 
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One way for law to push against dangerous, fear-driven, hopefully passing 
passions is for doctrinal formulations to reduce as much as is practically 
possible the role of discretion, judgment, and prediction in the application of 
laws to particular parties. That is exactly what Hand tried to do with his 
Masses test. In free speech disputes since then, courts for the most part seem 
to have taken his point by opting to employ somewhat crude, formalistic, all-
encompassing doctrinal concepts such as content discrimination and prior 
restraint, partly it would appear in order to make adjudication relatively 
mechanical. 
Reducing judicial discretion by means of doctrinal formalism might prove 
to be efficacious to a degree, but recall that Hand believed firmly that “liberty 
lies in the hearts of men and women” rather than in legal prescription or 
doctrine.111 This might suggest that the educative role of the First Amendment 
ought to be emphasized. When Madison managed to overcome his skepticism 
about the efficacy of bills of rights, which he termed “parchment barriers,”112 
one of his rationales was that a listing of rights could have a salutary effect 
by influencing public opinion or providing a standard around which ordinary 
citizens could rally in moments of official transgression.113 
How can the freedom of speech be made more educational? One way is 
by having articulate, inspiring expositors on the order of Holmes,114 Louis 
Brandeis,115 and Justice Robert Jackson.116 Another is by construing it so as 
to keep doctrinal formulations resonant with the most noble purposes and 
instructive object lessons that over the years gave rise to its pre-eminence 
among the various claims of liberty. In this respect, functional rather than 
formalistic criteria for determining the scope and meaning of the freedom of 
speech would seem to be indicated. The ways that both Hand and Madison 
read the First Amendment to be integral to the project of realizing and 
sustaining republican government is an example. 
However, functional analysis requires sophisticated understanding and 
wise judgment. In the wrong hands, sophisticated understanding can produce 
complicated doctrinal formulations—creative extensions of coverage, multi-
factor tests, differential levels of scrutiny—that mask partisan motivations, 
enable discriminatory application, and prove counter-productive 
educationally. It is the challenge for wise judgment to distill an appreciation 
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of functional complexity into operational principles and standards that are 
intelligible, intuitively just, and also relatively prescriptive so as to cabin 
discretion in application. Equipping the freedom of speech to do service in 
the worst of times is a worthy but also challenging undertaking, as Judge 
Hand appreciated as well as anyone. His Masses opinion, both the test and 
the rationale, was a start, but only that. 
SEVENTH 
He acknowledges that serious harms might follow from the speech he 
nevertheless rules cannot be prohibited. 
Possibly influenced by John Stuart Mill’s famous thesis in On Liberty that 
only harm can justify restricting individual freedom, reinforced by the 
ascendency in First Amendment law of Holmes’s clear and present danger 
test, the common tendency has been to justify the protection of free speech 
by minimizing the harm that it causes or contending that the harm can be 
mitigated or undone by “more speech.”117 This is the sticks-and-stones theory 
of the First Amendment.118 
Describing the strident writings and satirical cartoons at issue in the case, 
Hand in Masses goes out of his way to eschew this rationale: 
[P]ublications of this kind enervate public feeling at home which is 
their chief purpose, and encourage the success of the enemies of the 
United States abroad, to which they are generally indifferent. 
Dissension within a country is a high source of comfort and 
assistance to its enemies; the least intimation of it they seize upon 
with jubilation. There cannot be the slightest question of the 
mischievous effects of such agitation upon the success of the 
national project . . . . 
. . . .  
The defendant’s position is that to arouse discontent and 
disaffection among the people with the prosecution of the war and 
with the draft tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper 
among the troops. This, too, is true; men who become satisfied that 
they are engaged in an enterprise dictated by the unconscionable 
selfishness of the rich, and effectuated by a tyrannous disregard for 
the will of those who must suffer and die, will be more prone to 
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insubordination than those who have faith in the cause and 
acquiesce in the means.119 
His ruling was that even though the speech at issue was likely to prove very 
harmful to the war effort in a variety of ways, it could not be made the basis 
for criminal prosecution or the denial of access to the mails because it belongs 
to a category of speech, the freedom of which is integral to creating the very 
governmental authority that was being invoked to regulate it.120 
Actually, Hand’s treatment of harm in Masses is not really antithetical to 
Mill’s analysis in On Liberty. Mill never maintained as a matter of principle 
that proof of harm is always sufficient to justify the restriction of individual 
liberty. He states his famous Harm Principle to be: 
[T]hat the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for 
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are 
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or 
visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, 
the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated 
to produce evil to some one else.121 
Proof of harm is necessary in Mill’s scheme to justify the restriction of 
individual liberty but not always sufficient to do so. And lest there be any 
doubt about the importance to Mill of this distinction between the necessary 
and the sufficient, in Chapter Two of On Liberty, entitled “Of the Liberty of 
Thought and Discussion,” he never once addresses the question of when and 
how speech can cause harm and what that means for his analysis.122 That is 
because, as Mill specifies immediately preceding that chapter, he is arguing 
for “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects” including the 
“liberty of expressing and publishing opinions.”123 He contends that 
individuals must be permitted to circulate even concededly harmful 
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opinions.124 Regarding thought and discussion, proving harm is not sufficient 
to warrant restriction. 
In Chapter Three of On Liberty, entitled “Of Individuality, as One of the 
Elements of Well-Being,” Mill does indeed discuss harm with his well-
known example of a speaker telling “an excited mob assembled before the 
house of a corn-dealer” that “corn-dealers are starvers of the poor.”125 That 
speaker, says Mill, “may justly incur punishment,” even though the same 
statement “ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the 
press.”126 We might be tempted to interpret this passage to be making a 
distinction that turns on the likelihood that harm will follow from the speech, 
with speaker physical presence, crowd agitation, and victim proximity all 
factors that increase the odds. If that were Mill’s point, then he would be 
saying that a sufficient probability of sufficiently serious harm justifies the 
punishment of speech that would otherwise be protected by his liberty theory. 
Were that true, Mill would differ from Hand regarding the relevance of harm 
to the regulation of speech. 
I do not believe that to be the proper interpretation of Mill’s corn-dealer 
example, however. First, the example appears in Chapter Three, where the 
subject is individuality as an element of well-being, not Chapter Two, where 
the subject is the liberty of thought and discussion.127 This suggests that with 
the corn-dealer example Mill is exploring the relation of harm to the 
regulation of a broader range of conduct than thought and discussion; he is 
exploring the relation of harm to individuality more generally. And there can 
be no doubt that with regard to liberty generally, excluding only the liberty 
of thought and discussion, Mill does indeed maintain that proof of the 
requisite harm will often justify limiting the liberty.128 
Interpreting the excited mob version of the corn-dealer example to be not 
about thought and discussion, but rather about another form of liberty, one 
that can be restricted on the basis of harm, is supported by the way Mill 
introduces the example: “No one pretends that actions should be as free as 
opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the 
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their 
expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.”129 
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From this passage we know that Mill believes actions are to be treated 
differently from opinions, and that opinions which constitute positive 
instigations are to be treated differently from other opinions. Whether we 
label positive instigations “opinions” or “actions” is beside the point. In either 
event, they “lose their immunity” from the “absolute protection” accorded by 
Mill to “the liberty of thought and discussion,” the subject of Chapter Two, 
where he never discusses harm because it is irrelevant.130 For all activities 
other than thought and discussion—actions, positive instigations, trade, 
competition to secure scarce positions—harm is indeed relevant. It is a 
necessary and sometimes sufficient basis for restricting liberty, depending on 
the balance of considerations that bear on collective and individual well-
being. 
The distinction Mill perceives between thought and discussion and all 
other liberties is why he calls for different outcomes for his two corn-dealer 
examples, treating stirring up an excited mob in person as a fundamentally 
different activity from circulating the same message through the press.131 It is 
also why Mill is at such pains in Chapter Two, the longest chapter of On 
Liberty, to demonstrate the supreme importance of thought and discussion for 
human flourishing and progress in understanding.132 That supreme 
importance he does not claim for the full range of activities we commonly 
call “speech,” “expression,” or “communication,” as his mob-inciting 
example and treatment of positive instigation makes clear.133 
Frederick Schauer, who has written perceptively about speech and harm 
on numerous occasions and from different perspectives,134 confirms this 
reading of Mill and explains why it matters to First Amendment doctrine: 
If speech is understood as protected because it does not create harm 
in the relevant sense, such an understanding may . . . foster the view 
that only harmless speech is protected. And if speech is protected 
only because and when it is harmless . . . it may be too easy to think 
of harmlessness as a necessary condition for protection, and thus of 
harmfulness as a sufficient condition for regulation. But if instead 
we recognize, as I believe Mill did, that the liberty of thought and 
discussion protects communications that may well be harmful in 
                                                                                                                            
 130. Id. at 121, 86–120.  
 131. See id. at 121. 
 132. See id. at 90–91. 
 133. For an in-depth discussion of Mill’s corn-dealer example see C.L. TEN, MILL ON 
LIBERTY 133–36 (1980). 
 134. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 
81–111; Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635, 635–53 
(1993). 
744 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
any plausible sense of that term, and that it does so for reasons 
extrinsic to the harm and anti-paternalism principles, what emerges 
may be the robust free speech principle to which Mill plainly 
subscribed, and in the service of which Mill and On Liberty remain 
so important today.135 
Just like Mill, Hand in Masses identifies a subset of human activity, speech 
he calls “hostile criticism,” which plays such an indispensable role in 
constituting political authority in a republic that it must be protected without 
regard to what harm it might cause.136 In Areopagitica, his classic essay 
against the licensing of printing, the seventeenth-century poet John Milton 
makes a similar move regarding the speech he considers indispensable not 
only to republican governance—Milton was a fierce critic of monarchy and 
a devoted republican—but also to the discharge of duties owed to God.137 
Madison maintains in the Virginia Report that the federal government has no 
authority whatsoever to regulate seditious speech no matter the harm.138 The 
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan held that defamed public 
officials can recover damages against their critics only by proving that the 
harmful statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth,139 which means that good faith criticism of 
government is absolutely protected no matter how false and harmful it is.140 
It should be noted that in none of these instances of ruling out the relevance 
of harm is the exclusion comprehensive. Rather, harm is considered 
insufficient to warrant regulation as an exceptional matter due to the 
supervening importance or fundamentality of the subset of speech at issue. 
Thus, Hand’s holding in Masses that certain speech cannot be prohibited 
even when it is likely to cause specific, material harm does not mark him as 
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an isolated outlier; he has good company on this point. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that in determining the bounds of regulatory authority over 
speech, so careful, balanced, and thoughtful a judge would deny the relevance 
of a type of harm thought by millions, including himself, to be a true threat 
to the nation, all in the name of honoring the commitment to republican 
government. 
 
* * * 
These seven ideas demonstrate, I submit, how much more the Learned 
Hand of the Masses opinion has to offer than his “interest or duty” test, 
whatever its merits.  
